We develop an improvement to the weak laser pulse BB84 scheme for quantum key distribution, which utilizes entanglement to increase the security of the scheme and enhance its resilience to the photon-number-splitting attack. This protocol relies on the non-commutation of phase and number to detect an eavesdropper performing quantum nondemolition measurement on photon number. The potential advantages and disadvantages of this scheme are compared to the coherent decoy state protocol.
INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution is a powerful and practical application of quantum information theory. Quantum computing has the capability to cripple classical encryption schemes which derive their security from computational difficulty. However, quantum key distribution can solve this problem. A transmitter, Alice, and a receiver, Bob, can use the fundamental principles of quantum mechanics to generate a secure key that cannot be obtained by an eavesdropper, Eve, or broken with a quantum computer [1] [2] [3] .
In BB84 quantum key distribution, Alice sends single photon pulses to Bob. Alice prepares the photons with randomly chosen orthogonal bases, and, in the receiving lab, Bob has two bases in which to measure the photons. Bob randomly alternates between these measurement bases. If Eve attempts to measure the polarization of Alice's photon and sends the result of her measurement to Bob, then Eve will introduce errors into the key when she measures in the wrong basis. Alice and Bob can use these errors to detect the presence of Eve and evaluate the key's security 4 .
Unfortunately, a true single photon source is not experimentally available, so Alice must substitute weak laser pulses (WLP). The photon number probability of this coherent light follows a Poisson distribution, and multiple photon pulses expose WLP BB84 to the photon number splitting (PNS) attack.
In the PNS attack, Eve replaces the high loss channel between Alice and Bob with a lossless channel. Eve performs a quantum non-demolition (QND) measurement on the pulses to obtain number information without disturbing the polarization. When Eve encounters a pulse with a single photon, she blocks a fraction of the pulses to simulate the loss of the original channel. When she encounters a multi-photon pulse, she splits the pulse and stores one of the photons in a quantum memory. Eve sends the rest of the pulse to Bob. When Alice and Bob announce the bases used for each pulse in public discussion, the quantum memory allows her to measure the stored photons in the proper bases. This attack can allow Eve to obtain a significant portion of the key without being detected by Alice and Bob [5] [6] [7] [8] .
One solution to the PNS attack is to use coherent decoy states [9] [10] [11] [12] . Our alternative solution is to use entanglement to thwart the photon number splitting attack. This has led to the development of entanglement enhanced BB84 or EE BB84. Figure 1 shows a schematic representation of an entanglement ancilla that would be utilized in EE BB84. ss LS SL LLU 2. EE BB84 SCHEME Figure 1 . In the entanglement ancilla, for each photon pair generated by Alice, one is detected in her lab to obtain time information. The other is sent into a beamsplitter and then recombined at a second beamsplitter in the lab to create a pulse with halves that have a time delay that results from a length difference in the paths between the two beamsplitters. This pulse is then sent through the channel to Bob, who passes the pulse through two beamsplitters in his lab that have path differences identical to those in Alice's lab.
In EE BB84, Alice and Bob alternate randomly between WLP BB84 and the entangled decoy state ancilla. The primary use of the entangled states is not to distribute key bits, but to detect the presence of Eve. Alice mixes the entangled pulses randomly with the weak laser pulses to protect against the use of a QND measurement device. When Eve makes a photon number measurement during WLP BB84, she avoids detection. However, phase and number do not commute, so if Eve makes a number measurement, then Alice and Bob can use phase entangled decoy states to detect this action.
In the entangled state mode, we generate two time-entangled photons using spontaneous parametric down conversion (SPDC). Alice measures one of the two entangled photons to gather accurate time of emission information for the other photon. This setup gives a heralded single photon source. Like in BB84, the heralded photon is randomly assigned either a horizontal, vertical, diagonal, or anti-diagonal polarization. The heralded photon is then sent to a beam splitter which leads to the state . Half of the state travels down the longer arm, while the other half travels down the shorter arm. The halves recombine at the second beam splitter where there is a probability for the state to exit the quantum channel (see figure 1 ). The off-path detector distinguishes these possibilities and allows them to be neglected. Yet, when the pulse enters the quantum channel, it is an entangled pulse where half is delayed in time due to the extra path length of the long arm. Figure 2 . Possible paths a photon can take to get from Alice to Bob's detector: short-short (SS), long-long (LL), short-long (SL), and long-short (LS). Alice's time information allows the SL and LS paths, which are indistinguishable from each other to be distinguished from both SS and LL.
When Bob receives the test pulse from Alice, he detects the pulse by sending it through a beam splitter which puts the pulse through long and short arms identical to the setup in Alice's lab. After this, the pulse encounters the final beam splitter. There are three possibilities for the pulse. One possibility is that the photon takes the short path both times as in the path labeled SS in figure 2, or the photon could take the long path both times as in the LL path. These two possible results do not give strong information about Eve's actions. The other possibility is that the photon travels down one long path and one short path. These possibilities, SL and LS, can detect the use of a QND measurement device 13 . The photon is in a superposition of the LS and SL state, and its self-interference will result in a bright port and a dark port in the detection apparatus. But, if Eve is measuring number, then Bob's dark port will not be completely dark. If Eve makes a number measurement on the state, then it is no longer a superposition of the long path and the short path. Eve's measurement collapses the wave function to a specific path. When there is complete which-path information as the photon goes through Bob's detection apparatus, there is no self-interference, and the probability of detecting a photon in either the dark port or the bright port becomes equal. Even without an eavesdropper, the dark port will not be completely dark, since a practical system will have imperfections. However, Eve's actions will introduce additional errors, which can then be used to detect her.
In EE BB84, Bob's detection schemes for the entangled pulses and the signal states are different. This is not ideal, since if Alice and Bob are not operating in modes randomly, the security of the protocol can be completely compromised. If Eve can predict when decoy states will be sent, then she can make adjustments to her attack plan and render the entangled states worthless. Fortuitously, the decoy mode does not place too great of a burden on the key distribution rate, because Alice and Bob do not have to run it with very high frequency to detect Eve's use of a QND attack. But, since Alice and Bob must run separate modes at random times, mismatch of modes will cause a fraction of the pulses exchanged to be useless. Alice and Bob run WLP BB84 protocol with frequencies f SA and f SB . They use the entangled decoy state ancilla with frequencies f DA and f DB . If Alice assigns polarizations to the photons like in WLP BB84 when she is operating in the decoy mode, then Alice and Bob exchange key information with frequency f SA f SB + f DA f SB . This is because secure key bits can be extracted in this case as long as Bob is using the signal detection mode. The entangled decoy pulses then give information about Eve's potential QND measurements with frequency f DA f DB . The mode mismatch results in no useful information being exchanged with frequency f SA f DB . The signal mode frequencies are much larger than the decoy mode frequencies, so, although the inefficiency of the mode mismatch is undesirable, it ultimately does not defeat the practicality of the scheme. It also demonstrates the trade-off in quantum cryptography between speed and security.
STATISTICAL SCHEME ANALYSIS
We use symmetric hypothesis testing and Chernoff distance 14 to calculate the confidence in which Eve is known whether or not to be eavesdropping 15 . The null hypothesis is that Eve is not measuring number, and the alternative hypothesis is that Eve is using a QND measurement device to measure number. In the null hypothesis, the photon has probability to enter the bright port and probability to enter the dark port. In the alternative hypothesis, there is a probability to enter the bright port and a probability to enter the dark port. The maximum probability of choosing the wrong hypothesis is .
(1) is the Chernoff distance given by the equation:
The variable is defined as (3) and . We use equations 1 and 2 to calculate the number of trials needed for a given maximum uncertainty or probability for error, :
. (4) This analysis determines the number of trials needed to detect Eve with a given level of confidence in EE BB84 and coherent decoy states. Figure 3 . Dephasing can be caused by the environment, an eavesdropper or both. As the dephasing increases, the probability of finding a photon in the dark port increases. This causes the number of trials needed to detect an eavesdropper with 99% confidence to increase. When the probability of detecting a photon at the light and dark port is equal, it becomes impossible to tell an eavesdropper apart from the environment.
EE BB84 analysis
In the ideal case with no environmental dephasing, we can construct the probabilities for the two hypotheses simply. For the null hypothesis, the probability to enter the bright port is one, and there is zero probability for the photon to enter the dark port. In the alternative hypothesis, when Eve is making QND measurements, there is equal probability for the photon to enter either of the two ports. This results in a Chernoff distance of .69. Therefore, if a trial is defined as a photon sent by Alice and detected by Bob, the number of trials needed to detect Eve at the 99% confidence level requires an exchange of only 6 photons between Alice and Bob.
In a more realistic situation, dephasing is the primary concern, since the environment can alter the phase information of the entangled decoy state. With dephasing included, the probability for a photon to be detected in the dark port increases, and it becomes more difficult to distinguish Eve from the environment. With total dephasing the probability of finding a photon in either the dark port or the bright port becomes even. Figure 3 shows the number of trials needed to have 99% confidence that Eve is listening or not versus the probability of finding a photon in the dark port independent of Eve due to dephasing.
Coherent decoy state analysis
The current solution to the PNS attack is to use coherent decoy states. In this strategy, Alice alternates between sources with different mean photon numbers, n 1 and n 2 . Since Eve is blocking single photon pulses, the source with the higher mean photon number will have more multi-photon pulses, and Eve will allow a larger fraction of the pulses from this source to travel along the line. When Alice and Bob discuss the protocol, Alice can compare the loss of the line between the two sources, and if the sources have significantly different losses, then Alice can conclude that Eve is performing a PNS attack [15] [16] [17] [18] .
Alice inspects the percentages of n 1 and n 2 received by Bob and compares it to the percentages that she sent from these two sources. If she can distinguish them with an acceptable confidence level, then Eve is detected. This is treated in the same manner that we treated EE BB84. Figure 4 shows the number of pulses that must be sent to be 99% confident that Eve is present. The efficiency of this decoy state strategy improves as loss rises, but if loss becomes too high, then transmission obviously becomes difficult. The dotted and dashed lines are for the EE BB84 scheme at 10% and 30% dephasing respectively. For cases of very high loss, decoy states outperform EE BB84. However, for more moderate levels of loss, EE BB84 requires fewer pulses to confidently detect the presence of an eavesdropper compared to coherent decoy states.
CONCLUSION
The crucial part of coherent decoy states is that Eve is manipulating the photon number statistics in a manner which Alice can detect. Yet, if Eve can gain information that allows her to not perturb the photon number statistics in a detectable way, then coherent decoy states will not be a successful strategy for detecting Eve. Such a situation would clearly benefit from the implementation of EE BB84, but EE BB84 is also advantageous in some other cases.
The parameters and performances of EE BB84 and the coherent decoy state solution can change greatly depending on the environment and other factors. In figure 4 , the coherent decoy state parameters were chosen so that the percentage of n 1 pulses is 70% and the percentage of n 2 pulses is 30%. The dotted line shows EE BB84 with 10% dephasing, and the dashed line shows EE BB84 with 30% dephasing. For loss of less than 75% and dephasing less than 10%, EE BB84 outperforms the coherent decoy states by needing fewer pulses. At 50% loss, EE BB84 requires about a third the number of pulses of coherent decoy states to detect Eve with 99% confidence.
Coherent decoy states are a popular solution to the PNS attack for a reason. They achieve linear scaling with transmittivity. Also, coherent decoy states can generate a secret key without Bob needing to alternate detection modes. However, in EE BB84, Bob must alternate between polarization detection and phase detection, which gives coherent decoy states one advantage over EE BB84.
Presently, EE BB84 does not have general superiority to coherent decoy states. Thus, the value of EE BB84 is that it possesses some situational advantages to coherent decoy states, and it approaches the problem of the PNS attack in a way that is strategically distinct from that of the coherent decoy states solution. The general concept of the coherent decoy state solution is to improve the secret key transmission rate by limiting the amount of information that Eve can potentially obtain while still avoiding detection. For EE BB84, the strategy is to directly detect an eavesdropper performing QND measurements. This strategy is not better than the coherent decoy state solution. It is simply a different solution, and this difference leads to situations where EE BB84 is advantageous compared to decoy states, like when the operation time for key transmission is not long enough for decoy states to be a reliable defense. In cases like this, EE BB84 is advantageous, because it can detect the presence of QND measurements with a relatively small number of pulses.
